Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War.

Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War. In his autobiography, A Child of the Century, the Americanjournalist and author Ben Hecht Noun 1. Ben Hecht - United States writer of stories and plays (1894-1946)Hecht pointed out that trying to read historyin the pages of a newspaper is like trying to tell time with a watchthat has only a second hand. Dilip Hiro's attempt to produce a"contemporary history" of the Persian Gulf War in his book,Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War, falls prey to thesame miscalculation mis��cal��cu��late?tr. & intr.v. mis��cal��cu��lat��ed, mis��cal��cu��lat��ing, mis��cal��cu��latesTo count or estimate incorrectly.mis��cal . The book is divided into three parts. The first section gives thehistorical background to the "Second Gulf War," the Iran-IraqWar being the First Gulf War. In this section, Hiro, who is the authorof five other books on the Middle East, is on firm analytical ground,citing various texts on the Middle East and using his own extensiveknowledge of the politics and history of the region. The second sectionaddresses the period from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait The Invasion of Kuwait, also known as the Iraq-Kuwait War, was a major conflict between the Republic of Iraq and the State of Kuwait which resulted in the 7 month long Iraqi occupation of Kuwait[4] to the start ofthe war in January 1991, and the last section covers the war and itsaftermath up to the end of summer 1991. In the preface Hiro describes the creation of contemporary historyusing mass media sources. Most of his sources are newspaper reports orsummaries of television or radio broadcasts. Hiro asserts, however, that"journalists were the unwitting carriers of the disinformation dis��in��for��ma��tion?n.1. Deliberately misleading information announced publicly or leaked by a government or especially by an intelligence agency in order to influence public opinion or the government in another nation: peddled by the Pentagon, [that] the media became contaminated,"without explaining how he and his sources avoided such contamination.Furthermore, Hiro criticizes another contemporary history of the war,Bob Woodward's The Commanders, on the basis that Woodward failed tointerview President Bush; yet Hiro himself lists no interviews assources. The book reads as though Hiro took notes as the crisis wasunfolding and strung these together, unexamined, with some oldbackground material from his previous books. In essence, the reader isleft doubting the value of a contemporary history whose sources arecontaminated. In the first section, Hiro ably describes and analyzes the fourprevious Kuwaiti crises that have occurred over the last century. Ineach case, either the United Kingdom or the United States United States,officially United States of America, republic (2005 est. pop. 295,734,000), 3,539,227 sq mi (9,166,598 sq km), North America. The United States is the world's third largest country in population and the fourth largest country in area. intervenedmilitarily to guarantee Kuwait's territorial integrity Territorial integrity is the principle under international law that nation-states should not attempt to promote secessionist movements or to promote border changes in other nation-states. Conversely it states that border changes imposed by force are acts of aggression. and the freeflow of oil. Hiro does not explain, however, why Saddam Hussein thoughtthat this era of external protection was over. Hiro cites theassassination AssassinationSee also Murder.assassinsFanatical Moslem sect that smoked hashish and murdered Crusaders (11th—12th centuries). [Islamic Hist.: Brewer Note-Book, 52]Brutusconspirator and assassin of Julius Caesar. [Br. of scientist Gerald Bull, the Iraqi capture and executionof an Iranian-born British journalist and the Israeli politicalsituation in early 1990 as factors leading Hussein to believe that anIsraeli strike similar to the 1981 raid on Osirak was imminent.Furthermore, the internal Iraqi political environment was very volatile,and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were waging economic warfare against Iraq.Taken together, Hiro demonstrates clearly that Saddam Hussein was introuble by the summer of 1990. Desperation and a misreading of thestrength of his ally, the Soviet Union, led the Iraqi leader tomiscalculate mis��cal��cu��late?tr. & intr.v. mis��cal��cu��lat��ed, mis��cal��cu��lat��ing, mis��cal��cu��latesTo count or estimate incorrectly.mis��cal so badly in invading Kuwait on I August 1990. Hiro's measured tone and thoughtful discussion of issues inthe first section of the book break down in the last two sections. Here,Hiro produces a rather choppy narrative of political events that suffersfrom weak and polemic analysis. Despite the title of the book, Hiro paysscant attention to the military operation in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,focusing instead on political strategy. Military events are mentionedonly as they change or complicate the political maneuvering, and thereis no analysis of Iraqi or U.S. military operations. Hiro's tone also becomes distinctly anti-American, and histreatment of Saddam Hussein quite reverential rev��er��en��tial?adj.1. Expressing reverence; reverent.2. Inspiring reverence.rev . The Iraqi leader isportrayed as a reasonable man ready to negotiate at any time (after theinvasion, of course) while George Bush is "bent on war. " KingFahd of Saudi Arabia Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia (1923? - August 1, 2005) was the king of Saudi Arabia and leader of the House of Saud. One of thirty-seven sons of Saudi founder Ibn Saud, and the fourth of his five sons who have ruled the Kingdom (Saud, Faisal, Khalid, Fahd, and is alternately indecisive in��de��ci��sive?adj.1. Prone to or characterized by indecision; irresolute: an indecisive manager.2. Inconclusive: an indecisive contest; an indecisive battle. and weak or alsodetermined to go to war. Hiro puts forth some unattributed un��at��trib��ut��ed?adj.Not attributed to a source, creator, or possessor: an unattributed opinion.andunsubstantiated claims as well. He contends that the United States fakedthe satellite photos used to convince King Fahd that Iraqi troops wereconcentrating on the Saudi border and making offensive preparations. Healso states that Israeli warplanes were allowed to join U.S. sortiesfrom Turkey during the air war. Furthermore, according to Hiro, thewhole matter of the invasion, "would have been cleared up at themini-summit of Arab leaders, including Saddam Hussein and King Fahd, inJiddah on 5 August, had that meeting not been canceled by KingFahd." This reviewer was in Saudi Arabia with the 82nd Airborne Divisionduring that August, when U.S. intelligence - gathered through satellitephotos, radio direction-finding, reconnaissance flights and interviewswith the Saudi soldiers - showed concentrations of Iraqi tank units onthe Saudi border in an offensive orientation. Only in September 1990,after U.S. tank units began arriving, did the Iraqis move their tankunits away from the border to replace them with less mobile infantryunits assuming a defensive orientation. Furthermore, Syrian radar wouldhave picked up the flight of any Israeli aircraft to Turkey, and theArab coalition members would surely have responded. The coalition hadmade it quite clear throughout the war that any Israeli involvement wasunacceptable and would lead to their withdrawal from the coalition, oreven to their active support of Iraq. Finally, there was nothing theIsraelis could do to Iraq that the allied forces were not doing already. The argument that the whole situation would have been resolved atthe 5 August conference is impossible to prove, and Hiro makes noattempt to do so. The fact that previous such conferences had resolvednothing and that Hussein, having conquered Kuwait, had no reason tonegotiate, makes this assertion appear quite dubious. Indeed anydiscussion of the major protagonists' intentions in August 1990 ispurely speculative, since Hiro had no access to any documents. At this point, Hiro inserts several distracting and generallyunrevealing psycho-biographical descriptions of the key leaders at thestart of the crisis. He details several personal histories but does notelaborate on the way in which these life experiences might have affectedthe leaders' behaviors during the crisis and the war, if at all. These shortcomings are further compounded by contradictions incontent. First, the figures for American troops deployed in the Gulfconflict, are, from this reviewer's experience, completelyunreliable. There were not 59,000 American soldiers in Saudi Arabia by20 August, as Hiro claims. Furthermore, he harshly criticizes the UnitedStates for its inability to prevent civilian casualties during the airwar; yet he fails to mention that Iraq's SCUD missiles were onlyaccurate enough to hit large population centers. At one point, Hiro describes the Iraqi force as a "huge andbattle-hardened army," later representing it as undertrained, ThirdWorld rabble. The U.S. forces are portrayed as either a high-technologyjuggernaut or as composed of neophytes with poor morale. Hiro ignoresthe outrage in the West over Hussein's use of the civilianhostages, describing it as "first league stuff" in thepropaganda war. Hiro does not even present an explanation forHussein's December 1990 decision to release all the hostageswithout conditions. Hiro acknowledges Hussein's total control over both foreignand domestic media in Iraq and declares that the Iraqi internationalpropaganda machine was first rate. There were clear instances, however,of the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi propaganda effort. Hussein'spropaganda machine included the Iraqi Voice of Peace, anEnglish-language broadcast aimed at American troops in Saudi Arabia.Hiro describes several themes of Voice of Peace broadcasts including,"Your wife is waiting for you," and "Don't forgetwhat the gasoline emirs are doing with the American girls." Hefails to mention the Voice of Peace program in which an announcer toldU.S. soldiers that their wives and girlfriends were carrying on affairsback home with handsome Hollywood stars such as Bart Simpson. Clearly,these efforts were neither first-rate nor effective. The book's inconsistencies continue into the discussion of theend of the war; Hiro treats Hussein's last minute peace proposalsbefore the ground attack as legitimate offers, even though they includedconditions linking a withdrawal to an Israeli-Palestinian peaceconference - conditions that were clearly unacceptable to the allies. In these final chapters, Hiro offers vivid evidence to support thedecision by the Bush administration to halt the war with the liberationof Kuwait and not to continue the attack deep into Iraq. As the authorcontends, the United States would have exceeded the mandate granted bythe U.N. Security Council resolutions, triggering Iranian interventionand leading to the collapse of the alliance. Had the United Statesconquered Iraq, it would have been compelled to take responsibility forthe government succeeding Hussein's Baathist regime. There were nodemocracy-loving opposition leaders in Iraq to whom the United Statescould turn over power when it sought to end its commitment of troops tothe region. Hiro also argues that Hussein's linkage of the Gulf Warwith the Israeli-Palestinian dispute over the West Bank and Gaza wassuccessful, particularly among Americans, who viewed the Palestinianproblem as a probable cause Apparent facts discovered through logical inquiry that would lead a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that an accused person has committed a crime, thereby warranting his or her prosecution, or that a Cause of Action has accrued, justifying a civil lawsuit. of a subsequent Middle East war in which theUnited States might have to again intervene. This connection pressuredthe United States to push the Shamir government into the peacenegotiations in 1991. Hiro contends that the American interventioncombined with the collapse of the Soviet Union convinced the Syriangovernment that it was time to negotiate with Israel. In his conclusion, Hiro offers several powerful economic, politicaland geopolitical ge��o��pol��i��tics?n. (used with a sing. verb)1. The study of the relationship among politics and geography, demography, and economics, especially with respect to the foreign policy of a nation.2. a. reasons why any U.S. administration would have feltcompelled to intervene in Kuwait. Possession of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oilreserves would have given Hussein control of more than 20 percent of theworld's proven reserves, a position comparable to that of SaudiArabia. Iraq, unlike Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has no large financialinvestments in the West, and thus, no incentive to help maintain a lowerprice. Hiro argues that Iraq would have adjusted production to keep theprice of oil higher if given the chance. Such a price shock would havehad a tremendous negative effect on a world economy already inrecession, and would have allowed Hussein to rebuild Iraq, to maintain alarge standing army to use against Israel and to aggressively pursue theacquisition of additional nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.Finally, Hiro's strongest point is that an extremely skeweddistribution Skewed distributionProbability distribution in which an unequal number of observations lie below (negative skew) or above (positive skew) the mean. of wealth, autocratic modes of political control and theregion's historic instability and ample supply of arms can onlylead to more upheavals. Unfortunately this is not his last point; in his epilogue, Hirobelittles the Iraqi nuclear research program and suggests that theprospect of Iraq's possession of a nuclear device was a red herring Red HerringA preliminary registration statement that must be filed with the SEC describing a new issue of stock (IPO) and the prospects of the issuing company.Notes: of the allied political leaders. U.N. inspections since the end of thewar have revealed the disturbing extent of the Iraqi program, thecomplicity of Western politicians and businessmen in assisting it andthe terrifying determination with which Hussein still pursues his goal. Neither this book nor any contemporary history can analyze thelingering effects of the war on sociopolitical so��ci��o��po��li��ti��cal?adj.Involving both social and political factors.sociopoliticalAdjectiveof or involving political and social factors conditions in the PersianGulf region or in the pan-Arab community. A detailed chronology ofpolitical strategies and maneuvers during the war and a thoughtfulconclusion are unfortunately marred by incomplete, partisan andunsubstantiated analysis. A genuine history of the Second Gulf War willhave to await the scrutiny of documentary evidence A type of written proof that is offered at a trial to establish the existence or nonexistence of a fact that is in dispute.Letters, contracts, deeds, licenses, certificates, tickets, or other writings are documentary evidence. from both sides.